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PART 1: OUTLINE AND LIMITS OF
SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY
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Introduction
During the last 150 years, evolutionary theory has become the standard
theoretical explanation for the origins of life and the center of a new
cosmology that other sciences dogmatically assume when developing
research methods and interpretations of reality. Christian theology, as a
scientific enterprise, is no exception to this rule. Evolution dismisses
divine creation as nonscientific myth. To avoid this charge, theologians
have proposed various versions of theistic evolution and harmonization.
Thus, the challenge theologians must contend with is whether the only
choices available to them are mythological faith or scientific truth.
Further, it is necessary to consider whether a belief in creation necessarily
entails a sacrifice of the intellect.
The creation-evolution debate, including the theological attempt at
harmonization, generally takes place at the level of conclusion without
taking into account the nature of the processes through which theologians
and scientists arrive at their respective beliefs. This indicates that the
problem is not about faith (i.e., religious experience) and science, but
about the differences between two scientific enterprises-Christian
theology and the empirical sciences. The process through which science
arrives at its conclusions is complex. This article will attempt to present
a brief discussion of the main structures and characteristics of science and
theology in order to facilitate interdisciplinary dialogue and to help the
church gain a realistic perspective of the present intellectual situation.
Therefore, this article will not be an analysis of the teachings of
evolution and creation, but rather the rational processes that led to their
formu1ations.l My goals in part 1of this series are to examine how human
beings arrive at conclusions and at truth and to examine in what way the
Bible serves as the foundation of truth.' This will be done by providing
'This approach belongs t o philosophical research in the area of epistemology and
hermeneutics.
'These questions were suggested to me by the organizing committee of the International
Faith and Science Confeence sponsored by the General Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists, Ogden, Utah, August 23-29,2002.
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an introduction to the complex matrix of human rationality and the
scientific method involved in the conception and formulation of
theological and scientific teachings.
I will assess the relationship between evolution and theology from a
methodological perspective by outlining the rational basis and structure of
the scientific method. This will be done in several steps. First, in part 1,we
will examine the pattern through which knowledge is generated and the
general structure of method. O n this basis, we will reflect on the need to
demythologize science. Next, we will analyze the basic outline of the
empirical scientific method and consider its outcomes. Finally, we will
examine some postmodern criticisms to scientific methodology. In part 2,
I will explore the role that the scientific method plays in the construction
of evolutionary theory. Part 3 will address the relationship between
evolution and theology.

Relational Pattern in Knowledge Formation
We will begin by analyzing the process through which theological and
scientific ideas are formed. Thus, we must examine how human reason
function^.^ We are used to thinking about concrete objects that we see or
imagine through constructive models. However, there is another element
in the process of thought-what we do when we think, i.e., how we come
to understand something. Scientific and theological methods are founded
on particular approaches to and definitions of understanding. Thus, it is
necessary to understand how scientists and theologians come to a
particular methodological approach to knowledge (reason).
Reason as Subject-Object Relationship
All cognitive activities spring from the subject-object relationship, which
functions as the foundational cognitive unit. Because knowledge always
takes place as a subject-object relationship, this structural unit is at the
heart of experience f ~ r m a t i o nExperience,
.~
then, takes place between a
cognitive subject (human being) and a cognitive object (whatever falls
within the intentional consciousness of human beings). Because both
theological and scientific knowledge fall within the realm of experience,
they take place within this unit. Further, these types of knowledge are
formalized, i.e., carefully organized, which helps to differentiate these
'I use the term "reasonn in a wide sense to include all human cognitive activities.
4Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuge einw Metapbysik der Erkenntis (Berlin: De Gruyter,
194 I), 1.5.a.1; 5.1.1 .a; see also Fernando Luis Canale,A Criticism of ;rheologicul Reason: Time
and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral
Dissertation Series, vol. 10 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1983), 27-34.
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types of knowledge from common knowledge. The process of knowledge,
then, takes place when the human mind directs itself to an object.
The Levels of Operation of Reason
In the generation of human knowledge, the subject-objectpattern of reason
operates in three distinct but interdependent levels: sensory perception, the
intellect, and reasoning5 Sensory perception allows for information to be
received from realities outside the human mind. The intellect then forms
from this information general concepts that allow humans to be able to
communicate. Reasoning searches for unity and coherence among all
information received and conceptualizations produced by the previous two
operations. The scientific method builds on these basic rational operations,
which are the basis of observation, testability (sensory perception),
generalizations, hypothesis, law (intellect), and theory (reasoning).
Immanuel Kant described the organizing drive of human reason (third
operation). H e argued that notions and concepts are organized around
three guiding centers or ideas. From lesser to greater reach, they are
human nature, the world, and God.6Kant describes the function of these
ideas as "regulative."' These "regulative" ideas arrange cognitions "into a
system, that is to say, to give them connection according to a principle.
This unity presupposes an idea-the idea of the form of a whole (of
copition), preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and
containing the conditions which determine h priori to every part its place
and relation to the other parts of the whole system."8
What Kant called "regulative" ideas, i.e., the ideas of human being,
world, and God, I designate macro-hermeneuticalpresuppositions.9Kant
'Aristotle and Kant recognized these levels, but interpreted them in different ways.
Aristotle's views are known as intellectualism and were used by classical philosophers and
theologians; see Posterior Analytics, II, 19; and Metaphysics I, 9. Kant's views, known as
transcendental idealism, became influential in modern times. He believed that "all our
knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason,
beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the
matter of intuition and subjectingit to the highest unity of thoughtn (CritiqueofPureReason,
trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 19901,189).
6Kant,209, states: "It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three
classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned)unity of the thinking subject,
the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third the
absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general."

'Hans Kiing dividesthe field of theologicalinterpretation into three separatecategories:
macro- (the study and classification of philosophical issues"), meso- (issue or doctrinal

was correct in his identification of the ideas and their unifying and
systematic roles in human reasoning. Due to his modern context,
however, Kant was not able to perceive that these ideas can be interpreted
in different ways and therefore can render different results when applied
as regulative principles. In other words, different interpretations of these
ideas will produce different rational arrangements of the systematic whole
of human knowledge.
Modernity and Objective Reason
Throughout history, philosophers have debated about how the relative
function of the subject and object should be understood. Classical and
modern scientific thinking gave priority to the object by assuming that
the subject passively receives input from its objects. This emphasis defined
the notion of scientific objectivity as excluding all contributions from the
cognitive subject.
Richard Rorty describes the classical and modern interpretations of
the functioning of scientific knowledge as foundationalism, the notion
that the truth of our propositions is determined by "privileged relations
to objects those propositions are about." Thus, truth is solely determined
by "compulsion from the object known."1° The myth of science, as
rendering absolute certain knowledge, builds on the foundationalist
understanding of knowledge." O n the other hand, German idealism went
to the other side, giving maximum priority to the thinking subject, who
is supposed to create its own objects of thinking.
However,postmodernity has brought significant changesin definition to
the subject-object relation. During the twentieth century, developments in
philosophical hermeneutic~~~
and the philosophy of science showed that all
interpretation"), and micro- (textual interpretation) models (Theology for the n i r d
Millennium: An Ecumenical View,trans. Peter Heinegg [New York: Doubleday, 19881,134).
''Richard Rorty, The Minor of Nature, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979), 159.
"For the "myth" of science, see "Demythologizing Science" below.
12"PhilosophicalHermeneutics" is the term for the philosophical discipline which
studies the human phenomenon of interpretation. Hermeneutics is closely related to
epistemology in that both study the way human knowledge (reason) functions. The
disciplinary difference between the two seems to be related to their objects. The former
studies how we understand historical phenomena. The latter studies how we understand
natural phenomena. For an introduction to the historical development of philosophical
hermeneutics, see Raid Kerbs, "Sobre el desarrollo de la hermenkutica," Analogh Filosdfica,
2 (1999): 3-33. For an introduction to the issues studied by philosophical hermeneutics, see
Josef Bleicher, ContemporaryHermeneutics: Hermeneuticsas Method, PhilosopLy and Critique
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical
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knowledge results from contributions made by both the object and the
subject,13both of which perform active and passive roles.
The debate between classical-modern and hermeneutical approaches
over the action of the subject and object is particularly notable in regard
to the creation-evolution debate. Those who continue to assume the
classical-modern notion of objectivity have been profoundly challenged
by the development of postmodern philosophical hermeneutics.
Postmodernity and Hermeneutical Reason
Hermeneutical reason can be summarized as "to know is to interpret.""
Contrary to common belief, this does not mean total relativism, but only
the reinterpretation of the meaning of objectivity. Even though
hermeneutical reason recognizes the input from the subject's prior
experience in the formation of knowledge, it also recognizes the decisive
contribution of the real object to which the subject's mind is addressed.
In correspondence with the subject-object relation discussed above,
classical-modern objectivism assumes the existence of an "absolute
universal truth" independent from the subject's contribution. The
hermeneutical approach, by way of contrast, allows for conflicting
interpretations of knowledge. Therefore, because human reason produces
conflicting interpretations, the hermeneutical approach is better able to
deal with the problem of the subject-object pattern of knowledge
formation than the classical-modern approach.
Conflict of Rational Interpretations

By making the rationality of conflicting interpretations possible, this
epoch-making shift does not solve the creation-evolution debate, but
-

-

-

Hmeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
"See, for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer
and Donald G. Marshall, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989); and Paul Feyerabend,
Against Method, 3d ed. (London: Verso, 1993), 51.
14David Tracy explains the universality of interpretation in the following way:
"Imerpretation seems a minor matter, but it is not. Every time we act, deliberate, judge,
understand, or even experience, we are interpreting. To understand at all is to interpret. To
act well is to interpret a situation demanding some action and to interpret a correct strategy
for that action. To experience in other than a purely passive sense (a sense less than human)
is to interpret; and to be 'experienced' is to have become a good interpreter. Interpretation
is thus a question as unavoidable, finally, as experience, understanding, deliberation,
judgment, decision, and action. To be human is to act reflectively, to decide deliberately, to
understand intelligently, to experience fully. Whether we know it or not, to be human is to
be a skilled interpreter" (Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope [San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987],9).
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places it on different footing. The classical-modern view of reason
excludes the possibility of conflicting rational interpretations; only one
rational explanation is possible. Classical and modern guidelines, which
are generally assumed in the creation-evolution debate, force contenders
to dismiss the opposing view as rationally impossible. This is because, as
discussed above, the postmodern hermeneutical view of knowledge
formation allows for the existence of more than one rational explanation
of the same issue thereby creating a conflict of interpretations not
preempted by rational demands. This does not, however, imply that both
conclusions are "true." Thus, objectivity still reigns in postmodern
hermeneutical reason. While conflicting interpretations are not ruled out
as "irrational," the assumption is that only one can be true. Recognizing
the limitations and historical dynamic of the process of knowledge
formation, hermeneutical reason admits that it is not always ~ossibleto
identify the "true" interpretation. Postmodern hermeneutics does not
force contenders to dismiss opposingviews as rationally impossible. Thus,
theologians are not forced to seek harmonization between creation and
evolution on rational grounds. Therefore, method might be able to
achieve what cognitive capabilities cannot. It may be possible that the
correct scientific approach will produce enough certitude to help
theologians decide between creation and evolution.

What is Method?
Before turning to theological and scientific methodology, an acquaintance
with the inner structure of method in general is needed.15 This will help to
organize our thoughts on theological and scientific methodologies and to
retrieve relevant information from studies in the fields of epistemology," the
philosophy of science," and theological prolegomena relevant to the
creation-evolutiondebate. These studies assume the existence of science and
attempt to describe its function and to evaluate its grounds and claims.18
Josi Ferrater Mora suggests that method "follow[s] a certain 'way,'
15Fora brief introduction to the notion of method, see my "Interdisciplinary Method
in Christian Theology? In Search of a Working Proposal," Neue Zeitschrzjif i r Systematische
neologie und Religionsphilosophie43 (2001): 366-389.
16"Epistemology"is the name of the discipline that studies the foundations on which
scientific knowledge builds. For an introduction to epistemology, see Rorty.
'7"Philosophy of Science" is the name of the philosophical discipline that studies the
disciplinary matrix of scientific activities. This discipline includes a general approach to
science, as well as specific approaches to each discipline.
''This approach was pioneered by Irnmanuel Kant late in the eighteenth century. In his
Critique of Pure Redson, he studied the claims of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics.
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6 6 6 ~ ,in order to reach a certain goal."19 This general and simple
descri~tionuncovers one of the most distinctive characteristicsof method:
action. If method is the path we follow in order to reach a goal, its
essential characteristic is activity." As activity, method is repetitive and
has conditions. Thus, repetition is essential to the notion of method and
repeated experimentation using the same method should render similar
results. Less recognized, however, is the fact that conditions are also
essential to the notion of method. Thus, methodic activity is conditioned
by the concrete goal(s) it attempts to reach, the data it requires, and the
ideas it assumes in processing the data and reaching its goals. The goals of
method are its teleological condition, the data its material condition, and
the ideas it assumes are its hermeneutical condition. The concrete profiles
of theological and scientific methods become shaped by the interaction of
all the conditions.
In this way, method includes in its essence the major epistemological
issues that need to be considered when asking how theologians and
scientists arrive at their conclusions. Familiarity with issues such as the
origin of reliable information (from the perspective of the object),
interpretation of the data (from the perspective of the subject), and the
validity of conclusions and the truth of a belief (from both the perspective
of the object and the subject), will help us to better understand and
evaluate the debate between creation and evolution.
Any analysis of concrete philosophical, scientific, or theological
methodologies should account for the conditions on which they build
their conclusions. In the case of evolution, the reliability of its conclusions
is specifically connected to the assumed trustworthiness of its method.
The importance of method in theology is also paramount because it
defines the overall direction, content, and teachings of particular
theological schools and religious communities in a decisive manner.
Seventh-day Adventists, for instance, address the creation-evolution
1

19Jos6Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de Filosofh, 5th ed., 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Sudamericana, 1965), s.v. "method."
''Bernard Lonergan correctly describesmethod as "a normative pattern of recurrent and
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" (Method in Theology [New
York: Crossroad, 19791,s). "There is method, then," explains Lonergan, 4, "where there are
distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations
forms a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where
operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the fruits of
such repetition are not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive." Consequently,
Lonergan, 6-25, organizeshis discourse on method as an identification and explanation of the
operations involved in the task of doing theology. John Macquarrie agrees with Lonergan's
definition of method, but goes on to apply it in a different way to the task of theology
(Principles of Christian Theology, 2d ed. [New York: Scribner's, 1966],33).
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debate from personal conclusions that in many ways are dependent on
studies that other theologians and scientists have made. For this reason,
it is very important to consider the epistemologicalbasis on which others
have built the views we come to share or reject. The focus of this article
is on the process by which theological conclusions and scientific method
serve as the basis for the construction of the theory of evolution. This
analysis becomes indispensable when theologians are called to think as
representatives of the community of faith. It may also help to clarify the
theories involved, bring an assessment of personal views on creation and
evolution, and lead to understanding the way in which these relate to the
entire body of Christian beliefs.

The Legend
For at least two centuries, the empirical sciences have enjoyed the unlimited
prestige and authority that previously belonged to the medieval church. Due
to the need for answers to perennial questions and a dissatisfaction with
traditional pMosophical or theological explanations, theologians have turned
to science for answers. Moreover, empirical science seems to be closer to the
facts than philosophy and theology; ihus modern and postmodern cultures
confer to it a higher reliability and authority. Popular culture willingly and
uncritically accepts as true the pronouncements of a small community.
Scientists have become prophets; scientific methodology has become divine
inspiration. For the common man to say that something is "scientific" means
that it is
What the general public seems to assume is that the achievementsthey read
about in the educational pages of their newspapers and the threads they
seem to perceive come from a single source and are produced by a uniform
procedure. They know that biology is different from physics, which is
different from geology. But these disciplines, it is assumed, arise when "the
scientific way" is applied to different topics; the scientific way itself,
however, remains the same.'*

The notion that science could be wrong, that it is not absolute, or that it
provides alternativeinterpretations of the world escapes most, includingmany
scientists and theologians.
According to Philip Kitcher, the most detailed articulation of the
legend built around science has been provided "not by the practitioners
but by their amanuenses in history of science, philosophy of science, and
21PhilipKitcher, TheAdvancementofScience: Sciencewithout Legend, Obectivity without
Illusions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3.

sociology of ~cience."~'
However, things have radically changed in the last
fifty years or so. "Since the late 1950's [sic]the mists have begun to fall.
Legend's luster is dimmed. While it may continue to figure in textbooks
and journalistic expositions, numerous intelligent critics now view Legend
as smug, uninformed, unhistorical, and analytically ~hallow."~'
The brief description of science provided in the previous section clearly
dispels the myth of scientific method. According to Laudan, however, this
description of science is foundationalist,in need of criticism, and is itself a part
of the legend and myth of science. It affects not only the general public, pop
Thus, it is
culture, philosophers, and theologians, but scientists themsel~es.~~
necessary to probe further into the operation of scientific methodology not
by way of a general description, but by looking at what scientists really do
when constructing their theories.

Method in the Empirical Sciences
The way in which the so-called empirical sciences arrive at their
conclusions and the discovery of truth is by way of the empirical or
experimental method. To say that something is "scientific" means that
results are achieved through the application of the scientific method. It is
necessary, then, to gain a working knowledge of the "scientific" method
through which evolutionary theory has been produced. The scientific
method applied in the construction of evolutionary theory is a subclass
or application of the general empirical method of scientific research.
Consequently, the next three sections will address the structure,
conditions, outcomes, and postmodern criticism produced by
philosophers of science. O n this basis, we will consider how the scientific
method is applied in the construction of evolutionary theory.
In the area of empirical research, philosophers of science have done
a remarkable and detailed job. Particularly enlightening is the analytical
"Kitcher, 4. A staunch defender of evolution, he speaks of "legend" rather than "myth"
(4-10).

25Kitcher,219, notes that "at the heart of Legend is an epistemology articulatingthe simple
idea that scientific knowledge rests ultimately on observation and experiment. Much of
twentiethcentury philosophy, including the versions of logical empiricismthatprovidedetailed
articulations of Legend, adopts a static model of human knowledge. Abstracting from the
complexities of human belief formation one conceives of an idealized knower, in possession of
a body of evidence statementsthat represent the contribution of experience, and the project is
to identlfy the relations that must hold among statements if some are to justlfy others, and
thereby show how the evidential corpus warrants claims of theoretical science that may both be
universal in scope and also purport to describe entities remote from sensory experience."

and lengthy description of scientificresearch developed by Mario B ~ n ~ e . ~
Because the purpose is not to describe the steps involved in scientific
research but to outline the main epistemological structure on which
scientific methodology operates, I will not follow Bunge's order of
presentation. Instead, the analysis will be organized according to the
formal conditions or components that all methodologies must include in
their concrete undertakings. In so doing, I will only underline the main
characteristics of empirical methodology as a preamble to understanding
the "rational" status and scientific methodology of the theory of
evolution. This will help to highlight the disciplinarydifferencesthat lead
Christian theologians to propose the doctrine of creation and
evolutionary scientists to propose the doctrine of evolution.
Both theology and science are rational scientific enterprises. The basic
difference between them is not that one is rational and scientific while the
other is not, but rather that both use rationality and scientific
methodology from different data and both use different interpretations of
the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions.
Brief Description of Scientific Methodology
As argued above, method, at its core, is an orderly activity aimed at
reaching specific goals. Bunge sees method as "a procedure for handling a
set of problems."27Specific sciences and problems may require different
methods or procedures. When scientists speak of "scientific method" as a
general designation, they usually refer not to specific disciplinary methods
or procedures, but "to the whole cycle of investigation into every
problem of knowledge."" Thus, the main pattern of scientific
methodology may be summarized in the following activities: ask
well-formulated and likely fruitful questions, devise hypotheses that are
grounded and testable to answer the questions, derive logical consequences
of the assumptions, design techniques to test assumptions, test the
techniques for relevance and reliability, execute the tests and interpret
their results, evaluate the truth claims of the assumptions and the fidelity
of the techniques, determine the domains in which the assumptions and
the techniques hold, and state the new problems raised by the re~earch.'~
These steps take place within an established body of knowledge, from
*'Mario Bunge, Scientific Research I: The Search for System (Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1967); and idem, ScientificResearch II: The Searchfor Twth (Berlin:Springer-Verlag, 1967).
27Bunge,Scientific Research I, 8.
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which scientists generate problems that require solutions. These solutions
will eventually modify and/or enrich the established body of scientific
knowledge, from which scientific research starts. This description points
toward the need to demythologize popular notions of science, which
revolve around the idea that science affirms only facts that are susceptible
to the most rigorous experimentation. Although testability, e.g.,
experimentation, observation, remains a cornerstone of scientific
methodology, it is only one of its steps. To better understand the complex
nature of scientific research and the reliability and authority of its results,
the conditions of research need to be briefly considered.
The Teleological Condition
The teleological condition involves the goal and subject-matter of science.
The "goaln of science relates to the kind of knowledge scientific research
seeks to achieve through its methodology. The "subject-mattern refers to
the reality or realities scientists attempt to understand. The latter refers to
content and scope; the former to form and method.
According to Bunge, "what factual science seeks is to map the
patterns, i.e., laws, of various domains of fact." In other words, scientists
do not attempt to merely describe reality, but to discover its inner
workings. This specific objective shows that empirical science is not a
cosmography, i.e., detailed mapping of its events, but "a cosmology, i.e.,
a reconstruction of the objective patterns of events, both actual and
possible, whereby their understanding and forecast-hence their
technological control-is made possible.n30
Kitcher explainsthat "scientific
investigation aims to disclose the general principles that govern the
workings of the universe. These principles are not intended just to
summarize what select groups of humans have witnessed. Natural science
is not just natural history. It is vastly more ambitious. Science offers us
laws that are supposed to hold universally, and it advances claims about
things that are beyond our power to ~bserve."~'
Bunge summarizes: "In
short, there is no science proper unless the scientific method is applied to
the attainment of the goal of science: the building of theoretical images of
reality, and essentially of its web of laws. Scientific research is, in short,
the search for pattern."j2
The beginnings of science can be traced back to Greek philosophy. In
modern times, with the advent of empiricism and modernity, the empirical
"Philip Kitcher,Abusing Science: The Caseagainst Credtionism (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1982), 33.
j2Bunge,ScienttfEcResearch I, 28.
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sciences began a steady process of independencefrom philosophy. However,
independencehas never been complete. Science still depends on philosophical
ideas and producesphilosophicalconstructions.This becomes clearer when we
consider the hermeneutical condition of method and when we reflect on the
teleological condition or aim of science. As discussed earlier, the ultimate end
of empirical science is to build a cosmology (or worldview). This was exactly
the way in which Greek philosophy began and what still forms the goal of
metaphysics and ontology. The difference between philosophy and science,
then, is one of method rather than aim. This is important to bear in mind as
we deal with the conflict of interpretations between creation and evolution.
By way of its method, science attempts to "reconstruct" reality. Through
the influence of the Enlightenment, the myth of scientific rationality
developed. Scientific method was supposed to produce what traditional
philosophy could not, i.e., the absolute universal truth about reality. What
becomes evident in a study of scientific methodology is that even modern
philosophers of science who defend its rationality and are staunch defenders
of the theory of evolution concede that scientific method does not produce
absolute, infallible truth, but rather partial approximations.
Through its method, science proceeds to build progressively truer
~roblematic,and improvable) reconstructions of reality.)'
(albeit
"Hence, science cannot have an ultimate goal, such as building a complete
and flawless cosmology. The goal of science is rather the ceaseless
perfecting of its chief products (theories) and means (techniques), as well
as the subjection of more and more territory to its sway."j4
what empirical science seeks to underGand by way of its rigorous
research methodology, and the identification of the specific areas of
knowledge in which scientific methodology is applied, brings the need to
consider the content and scope of science. Empirical science can be applied to
any theory that can be tested empirically. As with Greek classicism,
ontological investigationbegan with the study of nature and expandedlater to
the humanities. This remains true among the branches of the empirical
sciences-the sciences of nature, e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and
individual psychology, and of the spirit, e.g., sociological psychology,
sociology,economics, political science, material history, and history of ideas.35

j51 am using Bunge's preliminary suggestion as an illustration of the general reach of
scientific methodology (ibid., 23-24). The modern application of scientific methodology in the
humanities has been seriously challenged by, for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truthand
Method). Gadarner's challenge, 4-5, to the application of scientific methodology in the
humanities came from the teleological condition of method. Because this challenge uncovered
ideas that led to postmodernity, it also affected the understanding of reason, and through it, the
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In this study, we are concernedwith the application of scientific methodology
in the natural sciences,particularly in geology,paleontology, and biology. We
will consider the "products" of science below. But first, we turn our attention
to the material condition of science.
The Material Condition
The question of where scientists obtain their information may be the
most publicized feature of scientific methodology. Scientists arrive at
"truth" because they build their conclusions on data they receive through
sensory perception. This empirical (Greek empeiria, "experience")
condition is so important that it is used to label the method and the
sciences that employ it.
The selection of sensory perception as the source of scientific knowledge
is required by the teleological and hermeneutical conditions of method. We
have already considered the teleological condition that the empirical sciences
use to study the whole of natural phenomena. Consequently, the choice of
sensory perception or experience as a source of data is necessary in order to
access reality, i.e., what is real. It is through sensory perception that natural
and historical entities are revealed to human reason.
Scientists, therefore, believe that their information originatesfrom "real"
rather than "imaginary" things. They take for granted that real things are only
those that can be accessed through sensory perception and/or technological
enhancement. As will be seen in the next section, scientists implicitly
presuppose an understanding of what "real" means, i.e., they assume
ontological ideas.36In other words, ideas come into science from the side of
the hermeneutical conditions of scientific methodology.
The material condition of scientific methodology takes place in two
modes: tradition and testing, i.e., observation. Thus, scientists obtain
information from two sources of empirical data. Our brief description of
scientific methodology made clear that scientific research starts by
identifying a problem, which has been suggested from the results of
previous studies. This is an "empirical" source of data because scientists
access it through sensory perception; but it is not experience or the
material condition that grounds the truth scientific methodology is
supposed to grant. The empirical source of information that grounds
scientific truth comes toward the end of the method when scientists test
scientific method in the natural sciences.
j6The ontological assumption of realism is general, without many philosophical
subtleties. Karl Popper's positivist account of scientific thought extends to realism's
overcoming the modern turn to the subject (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [London:
Hutchinson, 1968],93-94).

their hypotheses.37This order is required by the goal of science, as
discussed in the previous section.
The realization that the conception, formulation, and advancement
of hypotheses take place before, i.e., a priori, empirical testing helps us to
discover the pivotal role that tradition plays in scientific methodology.
After all, scientistsconstruct their hypotheses from questions arising from
previous scientific teachings. In so doing, they work not from "factsn
produced by nature, but from "factsnproduced by the human spirit, i.e.,
reason. From the viewpoint of content, this characteristic of the scientific
method appears as the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge;
from the perspective of formal communication of content, it appears as
tradition. Thus, science takes place within an "orthodox" tradition.
Tradition subsumes all that the researcher brings to the scientific method
and reveals the existence and operation of the hermeneutical condition.
Before considering the hermeneutical condition, I would like to
underline that the basic difference between theological and scientific
methodologies takes place at the level of the material condition.
Undoubtedly, it is here that the greatest discrepancy between the
theological and empirical sciences occurs. Following a tradition initiated
in modern times by Descartes, Locke, and Hume, scientists dismiss
supernatural revelation as a source of information on which to build their
views. This conviction directly flows from the macro-hermeneutical
notion that only things or events that present themselves to us in space
and time exist and can be taken as evidence on which to build scientific
knowledge. Consequently, the existence of God and his revelation in
Scripture are dismissed as fantasy.38This summary dismissal flows from
the fo~ndationalist~~
role scientists confer to empirical testing. In other
words, science confers "revelatory" status primarily to natural phenomena
and to historical phenomena only in a subordinate sense.4oThis is due to
the fact that testing hypotheses-the ultimate ground of scientific
truth-renders its best results when applied to the repetitive cycles of
nature.41Coupled to the empiricist foundationalism of science, we have
the "spiritual" foundationalism of Christian theology. Following Plato's
"Testing includes, for instance, observations, measurements, experiments (Bunge,

Scientific Research 1,222).

j9For an introduction to the notion of "Foundationalism," see Rorty, 155-164.
*As we will see below, the subordinate position of historical data affects the scientific
nature and reliability of evolutionary science when compared with the scientific nature and
reliability of the physical sciences.
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cosmology, Christian theology has conceived its area of study-God and
the realm of supernature-as a timeless and spaceless reality, i.e., spiritual
realm. Modern theology and the empirical sciences agree that religion
belongs to the realm of timelessness, and science to the realm of space and
time. By their very nature, the methods of theology and empirical science
do not conflict because they are mutually exclusive of one another. We
should not be surprised, then, when scientists dismiss religious experience
from the realm of empirical science or when theologians see no
contradiction between the theory of evolution and Christianity. Platonic
dualistic cosmology continues to survive today because it is able to
subsume evolutionary cosmology as a valid explanation in the
spatiotemporal realm. And it does so while retaining a deeper parallel
timeless-spaceless level for spiritual, i.e., supernatural, realities. Theistic
evolutionary schemes flourish in this soil.42Of course, as we will see later,
Scripture directly opposes Platonic cosmology by not accepting the
generalized notion that God and religion belong to a timeless, spaceless
realm. Conflict between evolution and creation can only take place if
both theories are understood to refer to the same field of reality, i.e., to
In short, acceptance of the
the temporal-spatial realm of ~reation.~'
Platonic cosmological framework defuses the conflict between creation
and evolution. We will come back to this issue later when studying the
way in which Christian theologies relate to evolutionary theory.
The Hermeneutical Condition
The hermeneutical condition refers to all the presuppositions required for
the proper operation of the scientific method. Bunge explains that "in
general, every problem is posed against a certain background constituted
by the antecedent knowledge and, in particular, by the specific
presuppositions of the problemn (emphasis original)." These
presuppositions constitute the a priori, i.e., the preontological state, of
scientific methodology.
Presuppositions may be thought to include the sum total of life
experience. Under the influence of classical philosophy, the modern age
understood scientific knowledge to be "objectivenbecause it was thought
42Seefor instance, Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology
(New York: Macmillan, 1929); and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man
(New York: Harper & Row, 1959).
4'0n this, see arguments against conventional thinking on science, presented by Larry
Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relrttivism: Theory, Method, and Evrdence(Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996), 223-230.
44Bunge,ScientificResearch I, 171.
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to be totally determined by the object. To ensure objectivity, modern
scientists were supposed to divest or purify themselves from all previous
experience. Personal experience was considered to be subjective bias or
prejudice. However, when human beings use scientific methodology, they
make concrete contributions which decidedly shape the outcome of both
reason and scientific method. This does not mean that science should
include ~ersonalbiases or prejudices. It only indicates, as we shall see, that
not all prejudices that are brought to science are negative. The scientific
method requires the use of hermeneutical presuppositions. For this
reason, we need to recognize and identify them as a condition of method.
In speaking of scientific paradigms, Thomas Kuhn brings the
condition of method to the attention of the scientific community. In so
doing, Kuhn does not create a new condition of scientific methodology.
O n the contrary, he only identifies and explains the role that the scientific
a priori has always played in scientific method. We should not forget that
the scientific a priori is required to get the method started. It is only from
the a priori that a problem can be defined and a hypothesis may be
advanced. The scientific a priori does not originate, as Kant suggested, in
the cognitive structure of humanity. Rather, scientists acquire these
presuppositions by belonging to the scientific t r a d i t i ~ n . ~ ~
The only way to become a scientist is by engaging in formal scientific
education.According to Kuhn, the part that education plays in developing an
"ordinary" citizen into a scientist is that it inculcates in students a scientific
paradigm or disciplinary matrix. Kuhn suggests that takes place by ways of
"exemplars," i.e., "concrete problem-solutionsthat students encounter from
the start of their scientific education, whether in laboratories, on
examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science texts."" Through the study
of exemplars, the student is taught to view "the situations that confront him
as a scientist in the same gestalt as other members of his specialists' [sic] group.
For him they are no longer the same situations he had encountered when his
training began. He has meanwhile assimilated a timetested and group-licensed
way of seeing"" Thus, "by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for
doing it" students learn "tacit knowledge.""
45ThomasKuhn explains that science is "research firmly based upon one or more past
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practicen (7%e Structure ofScient$c
Revolutions, 2d ed. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19701, 10). It is through tradition,
then, that scientists get their a priori hermeneutical presuppositions.
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Among the contents implicit in the "tacit knowledge" students
incorporate into their scientific a priori as a disciplinary matrix are an
"entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the
members of a given community."49This constellation of beliefs includes,
for instance, symbolic generalizations,50particular model^,^' values,12law,
theory, application, and instr~mentation.'~
This tacit, implicit knowledge that scientistsbring to method includes
various levels of inclusiveness. Because tacit knowledge contributes in the
generation of the meaning of scientific ~roblems,hypotheses, laws, and
theories, i.e., the outcomes of science, we can detect macro-, meso-, and
micro-levels of hermeneutical presuppositions working in empirical
science. The macro-hermeneutical presuppositions in empirical science
include the philosophical presuppositions discussed in this subsection.
Meso-hermeneutical presuppositions might include the disciplinary matrix
or paradigm of which Kuhn speaks. Micro-hermeneutical presuppositions
are the specific theories, laws, and problems that generate concrete
hypotheses in concrete scientific disciplines.54
In regard to philosophical presuppositions in the method of empirical
sciences,15Bunge correctly remarks that "philosophy may not be found
in the finished scientific buildings (although this is controversial) but it is
part of the scaffolding employed in their construction."" Earlier, I argued
that Christian theology includes in its formation an interconnected
ensemble of macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. Among other things,

52Values,such as accuracy, simplicity, consistency, plausibility, or preference of
quantitative over qualitative procedures, are used to judge theories (ibid., 184-186).

54This categorization in progressive levels of specificity is only an incomplete
suggestion. In "Paradigm, System and TheologicalPluralism," I refer to what I call "system,"
which I identify here as macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. The "system" designation
properly describes the inner coherence between the various macro-hermeneutical
presuppositions operating respectively in theology and empirical science (Evangelical
Quarterly 70 [1998]: 195-218).
"Due to their generalityand inclusiveness,these are macro-hermeneuticalpresuppositions
that correspond to the macro-hermeneutical presupposition level operative in Christian
theology. Since I am not a scientist, I leave others to distinguish between what Kuhn calls
paradigm or disciplinary matrix and the levels of meso- and micro-hermeneutical
presuppositions.
'('Bunge,

Scientific Research I, 291.

they deal with God, human beings, the world, the one and the many (the
whole), and reason. Scientists assume interpretations on these issues as
well. Many of the "scientific" interpretations of these issues are drawn
from philosophy or are created by the philosophical reach of an
overarching scientific theory. For instance, the evolutionary theory
becomes the cosmological macro-hermeneutical presupposition of
empirical scientific methodology.
Perhaps the broadest philosophical presupposition of science is that
the entities it studies are real, i.e., have existence outside of the human
mind (empirical realism). Their reality is presupposed in the grounding
notion of fact, which is the referent of scientific teaching and especially
the source of its testing procedures.'' Moreover, empirical realism
presupposes a spatiotemporal understanding of reality. In this, empirical
realism radically departs from classical Aristotelian realism.'* Not
surprisingly, this macro-hermeneutical presupposition requires the
rejection of classical ontology, including the notions of God and the soul.
The macro-hermeneutical role that God played in classical philosophy and
theology is now to be played by nature and history. Thus, the
immutability grounded by the classical notion of timeless realities, e.g.,
God, soul, essence, ideas, is replaced by ontological determinism.
Ontological determinism must be presupposed because the aim of
science is to discover the recurrent patterns of nature in order to predict
events. For scientific laws to be predictable, natural phenomena must be
themselves ordered by law. This is assumed on philosophical rather than
scientific ground. Popper refers to the nonscientific ground of science by
saying that the belief in the ontological lawfulness of nature is "a question
which obviously cannot be answered by any falsifiable theory and which
is therefore 'metaphysical': how is it that we are so often lucky in the
theories we construct-how is it that there are 'natural laws?'"59Popper
answers his question by noting that "regularities which are directly
testable by experiment do not change. Admittedly, it is conceivable, or
logically ~ossible,that they might change; but this possibility is
disregarded by empirical science and does not affect its methods. O n the
contrary, scientific method presupposes the immutability of natural
process, or the 'principle of the uniformity of nat~re.'"~'
58Ariaotelianrealism centers around the notion of first substance, which is a composite
of spatiotemporal (matter) and timeless (form) realities.

Sbid., 252. Bunge notes that ontological determinism has been seriously challenged by
the quantum theory "which acknowledges objective chance not only as a trait of complex
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The articulation of the whole as a complex of many parts is ordered
in a multilayered pyramid in which the "higher levels are rooted in the
lower ones both historically and contemporaneously.n61The main levels
from bottom to top are the physical, biological, psychological, and
sociocultural. This presupposition, for instance, requires that evolution
should be extended from its original biological level to the higher levels
that it supports, i-e., culture and history.
The macro-hermeneutical presupposition regarding the nature of
scientific knowledge has changed through the years and is presently under
serious scrutiny. This is due to philosophical changes in the interpretation of
reason, which were brought about during the twentieth century by the rise
of hermeneutical philosophy and which were popularized by the advent of
postmodernity. According to Bunge, until the second part of the nineteenth
century scientists assumed that in principle it was possible "to exhaustively
know the present, past and future states of any object in such a way that no
uncertainty about it remains."62This mythical assumption was replaced by a
limited knowability, according to which "science presupposes that its objects
are knowable to some extent, and it acknowledges that some of the limits to
knowledge are set by the objects themselves, whereas others are
Until the end of the twentieth century, scientistswere theoretical objectivists
following the modern interpretation of objective knowledge. That is to say,
they assumedtheir knowledge was generatedonly by the objects they studied.
In practice, however, their use of philosophical and scientificpresuppositions
in the operation of the scientific method anticipated postmodernity.
Postmodernity revolves around the philosophical-hermeneutical
discovery that human reason works from historically generated ~ r i n c i ~ l e s
of interpretation. Because they are historically generatedthey may change.
Change in the ~rinciplesof interpretation, especially at the macrohermeneutical level, may result in a change of paradigm that subsequently
generates a scientific r e v o l ~ t i o n .The
~ ~ notion that scientific teachings
depend on changing rules has caused great upheaval in scientific circles.
Larry Laudan characterizesthe current situation in scientific epistemology

systems but even at the level of 'elementary' particles, which obey stochastic laws. Whether
such a randomness is final or will eventually be analyzed as the outcome of lower level fields,
it is premature to deciden (Scienttfic Research I, 295).
"Bunge, Scientific Research I., 293.

@ThomasKuhn deals in detail with these issues in 7heStructure ofScientificRevolutions.

as a conflict between traditional positivism and relati~ism.~'
The fact
remains that scientific method uses hermeneutical presuppositions to
generate its problems, formulate its hypotheses, and test their
consequences. Even when interpretation, i.e., contribution from the
subject, is present in every step of scientific methodology, scientists have
not yet incorporated the hermeneutical turn in their methodology and
adjusted to its epistemological consequences.

Outcomes of the Scienttfic Method
Following the brief description of the main steps involved in the scientific
method and a description of the conditions involved in its operation, we
now turn to the outcomes of method. Scientists produce hypotheses, laws,
and theories. This consideration is important because it helps us to
understand the epistemological status of the evolutionary "theory." The
conditions of method work as presuppositions that directly or indirectly,
explicitly or implicitly, shape the concrete contents and epistemological
status of scientific outcomes. Let us consider them briefly.
Hypotheses
After defining a problem, scientists attempt to solve it by constructing
and testing hypotheses. An empirical hypothesis may be described as a
conjecture about certain unexperienced or unexperientiable facts which
are "corrigible in view of fresh k n ~ w l e d g e . "Thus,
~~
hypotheses are
assumptions about reality we construct in order to explain it. Therefore,
we may see them as interpretive schemes. Scientists construct their
hypotheses by drawing, implicitly or explicitly, from the interpretive
guidance of macro- (philosophical), meso- (disciplinary matrix), and
micro- (concrete disciplinary context) hermeneutical presuppositions.
Thus, hypothesis formation is a complex interpretive act because it builds
on three antecedent levels of interpretive acts and constructions.
A hypothesis is not a datum; but it should not be equated with fiction
either. Data and hypotheses share similarities: both result from
interpretation and are corrigible. Their basic difference is that data are
actual empirical experiences, while hypotheses are propositions about
nonexperienced realities. Bunge provides a useful example that may help
us to visualize the difference between data and hypotheses.
The information that the needle of a given meter is pointing to the 110
volt mark is a singularempirical datum: it may be tested by mere ocular

66

Bunge, Scienttfic Research 1,222.
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inspection. (In general[,] experiences, either single or in bundles, are
necessary to corroboratesingular empirical data. They are not sufficient,
though: some theoretical element will always be needed.) That this
datum refers to an electric current in the meter is no longer a datum but
a hypothesis.In fact (i) electric currents are inferable but not observable
and (ii) the hypothesis may turn out to be false, as the meter may be out
of order, so that its indications may be wrong.
Finally, hypotheses always say more than the data they attempt to
explain. This "plusn value of hypothetical thinking tends to build as
scientific constructions become more complex and involved, particularly
in the case of such all-embracingtheories as evolution.
Once formulated, scientific hypotheses play a hermeneutical role in
guiding the researcher in the design of testing approaches and techniques
that will corroborate or falsify a particular hypothesis. These techniques
also result from the interpretive constructions of scientists. (At this point,
the reader should bear in mind that in this section I am drawing mainly
from Bunge, who is not a postmodern relativist.) If interpretative
construction is present in the reception of data, the formulation of
hypotheses, the construction of testing techniques, and their evaluation,
one wonders why some scientists are so opposed to the postmodern
conviction that to know is to interpret.
Laws

A scientific law is a confirmed hypothesis that is supposed to depict an
objective pattern. According to Bunge, "laws summarize our knowledge
of actuals and possibles."67It would be incorrect, however, to assume that
scientists arrive at laws by simply testing hypotheses. The process through
which scientists arrive at laws is more complex. To understand this
process we need to bear in mind that the search for scientific law is the
search for sameness in an ever-changing reality.68
But how do we arrive at a universal law from changing realities in which
no two individuals are exactly alike? Plato invented a timeless, ontological
realm that supposedly grounded knowledge in a changing reality:9 withthe
advent of modern empiricism, Plato's ontological foundation of knowledge
was rejected. Accordingto the macro-hermeneuticalpresuppositions operating
in empirical scientific methodology, only concrete, changing, diverse,

''Empirical science is the last link in a long scientific tradition that originated with the
Greek philosophers. While Heraclitus understood the real to be in constant flux as an everchanging river, Parmenides conceived it to be an immutable sphere.
691nthis way Plato became a very influential foundationalist.

spatiotemporal entities are recognized as objects and referents of scientific
knowledge. Popper concludes that there are insurmountable difficulties in
inducing or inferring universal statements from singular ones." If induction
has problems, perhaps definite techniques for summarizing and generalizing
data would lead to universal laws. Unfortunately, laws are not the result of
simple generalization and summary. In the conception and formulation of
laws, scientists follow a hypothetico-deductive procedure. In other words,
they progressively invent, imagine, and construct new hypothetical
generalizations until, through a process of trial and error, they arrive at a
universal law.71We should bear in mind that the invention of universal,
all-inclusivehypotheses are attempts to explain and understand a multitude of
lower-level hypotheses that scientific research produces over time. These
attempts are motivated and made possible by the organizing drive of human
reason described by Kant. Bunge characterizes this drive of human reason
behind the formulationof universal laws and theories as the "nervous system
of science."" It is important to bear in mind that in inventing a universal
hypothesis, human reason selects only a fm traces of a multifarious and
complex reality."
To say that a law is a confirmed hypothesis does not mean that any
or all hypotheses become laws after they are tested and confirmed. Only
confirmed universal hypotheses can become laws. In order to confirm a
law we must descend from its "highmlevel of abstraction and universality
and through deduction "specify the circumstances under which" its "use
or test takes place."74
Theories
"The work of the scientist consists in putting forward and testing
theories.m75
In this subsection, we will consider briefly the nature, need,
formation, and limits of theory. In the next subsection, we will deal with
the testability of theory. According to Popper, "theories are nets cast to
'0Popper, 21-29.Bunge is of the opinion that such techniques produce "low level" laws
because they render only empirical generalizations (SciattficResearch I, 323).
71Bunge,ScientificResearcb1,323, explainsthat "there are no known rules for inventing
either high level concepts or the law statements that tie them up: unlike the finding of
empirical generalizations, the creation of theoretical concepts and laws is not a rule-directed
activity" (see also 346).
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catch what we call 'the world': to rationalize, to explain, and to master it"
(emphasis supplied)." Bunge describes the process through which
scientists arrive at theories in the following way:
As research develops, relations among the previously isolated hypotheses
are discovered or invented and entirely new, stronger hypotheses are
introduced which not only include the old hypotheses but yield
unexpected generalizations:as a result one or more systems ofhypotheses are
constituted. These systems are syntheses encompassing what is known,
what is suspected, and what can be predicted concerning a given subject
matter. Such syntheses, characterized by the relations of deducibility
holding among some of its formulas, are called hy~othetico-deductive
systems, models, or simply theories (emphasis original).77
One can argue that the difference between laws and theories resides in their
referents. Laws are hypotheses about an objective, recurrent pattern in nature,
while theories are hypotheses about broader chunks of reality. Theories are
not about recurrent patterns, but about complex portions of reality whose
explanation requires the putting together of existing laws and theories.78
Scientists go beyond the discovery of natural laws to construct
theories about large portions of reality. This is because reason compels
them t o do so. Reason understands the need to connect isolated parts into
progressively more inclusive wholes. Bunge explains that in science "a
factud proposition can acquire full meaning only within a context and by
virtue of its logical relations with other items."" It is not surprising, then,
that scientists build theories.
Theories should not be thought of as only the end result of scientific
reasoning, but also as presuppositions required for the proper operation
of the scientific method. "One cannot know whether a datum is
significant until one is able to interpret it, and data interpretation requires
theories."'O Besides, the formulation of a problem (the first step in the
application of the scientific method) requires the application of theories.81

781bid.He states: "'Theory' designates a system of hypotheses, among which law
formulas are conspicuous-so much so that the core of a theory is a system of law formulas."
7qbid., 382. Bunge, 382, explains further that these logical connections involve the
systematization or interconnectivity of hypotheses. "In short, systematization renders the
meaning of hypotheses more precise and enhances their testability. In addition, it explains
most of the hypotheses by subsuming them under stronger assumptions (axioms) and
intermediate level theories."

'lAs presuppositions, theories guide research and suggest new lines of investigation.
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Scientists arrive at theories by constructing explanations and by putting
things together. To say that theories are "constructionsnmeans that they do
not portray "literally a real thing, event, or process."" They are not snapshots
or summaries of things. Instead, they are sketchy and symbolic
reconstructions of real systems.83Theories are creations beyond reality which
are necessary to explain reality.84That theories are explanations means that
they are the result of invention and interpretation."Invention is the kernel of
theory constru~tion"~~and
means that there are no preset rules for theory
construction. Theories are original creationss6that proceed by interpreting,
rather than describing or summarizing observed realities." That theory
construction results from interpretation means that it "does not proceed in a
vacuum but in a preexistent m a t r i ~ . " ~ ~
Finally, theory construction necessarily involves idealization,
simplification, selectivity, hypothesizing, and the search for discrepancies
and deliberate departures from truth. Bunge describes the limitations of
scientific theories in the following words:
Every scientific theory is built, from the start, as an idealization of real
systems or situations. That is, the very building of a scientific theory
involves simplzfications both in the selection of relevant variables and in
the hypothesizing of relations (e. g., law statements) among them. Such
simplifications are made whether or not we realize that they amount to
errors-not mistakes but just discrepancieswith actual fact. Moreover,
this is not a mere descriptive statement concerning actual habits of
theory construction: it is a rule of theory construction that as many
simplifications as needed are to be made at the start, relaxing them
gradually and only according as they are shown to constitute too brutal
amputations. Such simplifications are, of course, deliberate departures
from truth.89

It is important to notice that theory construction is a speculative
enterprise that searches for understanding, coherence, and explanation at
the level of ideas rather than at the level of concrete facts.90This applies
'*Bunge, Scienttfic Research I, 385.

88Bunge,Scientific Research I, 449.

Tbid., 455, where he states: "In the processing of experience and in the invention of
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particularly to far-reaching theories like evolution. Theories are grand
hypotheses because they include and connect other lower-level theories,
hypotheses, and laws. In this process, the search for understanding
necessarily involves distortion and the possibility of wrong representations
of the world. Thus, scientifictheories, as scientific laws, exist at a high level
of generalization that is far removed from the realities and processes they
attempt to explain.
According to Bunge, "we should know a priori, from an analysis of the
very process of theory construction, that every factual theory is at best
approximately true, just because it involves too many simplifications and
some inventions that are bound to be inadequate to some extent because they
cannot be fully controlled either by experience or by logic."91
The way in which theories connect with reality requires a move from
the process through which scientists arrive at conclusions to the process
through which they arrive at truth. Let us consider, then, the testing and
corroboration of scientific theories.
Testing, Corroboration, and Scientific Truth
Scientific theories are not a summary of what scientistsdiscover and prove
through experimentation. The pathway of scientific method "is not from
data to theory but data to problem, from problem to hypotheses, from
hypotheses to theory, and back from theory and evidence to a projection
that can be checked by another piece of evidence-with the help of further
theories."92Through the process of theory construction, scientists create
a coherent explanation of the data available to them, which is invented
with the help of a particular perspective or heuristic idea.93Scientists,
however, want more than merely coherent explanations. Metaphysics
provides coherent explanations. What distinguishes a metaphysical from
a scientific explanation of the world is that the former cannot be tested,
while the latter can. By testing through experiment or observation,
scientists attempt to falsify or corroborate their hunches, i.e., hypotheses
-

-

-

ideas, most particulars are discarded and the rest are disfigured rather than carefully collected
and packaged. Precepts, which anyhow are products of analysis rather than raw experiences,
are mostly discarded in the process of selecting relevant items. And those that are picked out
become transmuted into ideas, which are in turn anything but faithful reproduction of the
given. A posteriori we discriminate and sort out the ideas and come to realize that some of
their component unites-concepts-have no experiential counterpart, this being why they
have a chance of participating in the explanation of experience."
'lIbid., 549.

and theories. Scientificmethodology, then, finds its distinctive foundation
through empirical testing.
Scientists test their hypotheses and theories, which are abstract
generalizations far removed from concrete existing realities in space and time
and that can be neither verified or falsified directly, by deducing from the
theory a consequence that can be tested by observation and experiment. In
other words, scientistsapply their theoretical construction to reality in search
of a recurrent reality (event) that can be tested through experimentation.
Testing, then, is applied to "statements asserting that an observable event is
occurring in a certain individual region of space and time."94The results of
testing determine whether a theory is falsified or corrob~rated.~~
For a theory to be falsified, it must first be falsifiable. According to
Popper, a theory is falsifiable when it rules out at least one typical recurrent
event in space and time." Actual testing, then, takes place by observation of
a spatiotemporal body.97If a theory is falsified, it must either be modified or
rejected and replaced by a better one. However, accordingto Popper, theories
cannot be verified, but only corroborated in various degrees.98The degree to
which theories may be corroborated is not determined by the number of
corroborations, but by the severity of tests to which hypotheses have been
subjected.%Testing, however, is not beyond interpretation.O n the contrary,
not only the construction of problems, hypotheses, laws, and theories, but
also testing, experimentation, and the instruments used in them are
conditioned by theory and the teleological, material, and hermeneutical
conditions of method.'''
The result of this conditionality is significant. It shows, for instance,
that corroboration of theories should not be confused with truth.''' This
is so because one expects scientists to explain why their theories are
supposed to be held as truth. Truth is not claimed for corroborated
scientifictheories. The epistemological analysis of scientificmethodology,
however, reveals that the myth of science as objective, absolute truth does
not match the reality of what scientists and human reason are able to
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perform. O n the contrary, it shows that 'no theory is unambiguously
determined by experience."'** Popper helps us to see how limited is the
corroboration of scientific theories by comparing testability and
experimentation to structural piles that sustain the edifice of scientific
theories over the swamp of everyday opinion:
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing "absolute*
about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure
of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building
erected on piles [testing]. The piles are driven down from above into
the swamp, but not down to any natural or "given" base; and if we
stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm
ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.lo3

The piles in Popper's metaphor relate to the empirical base or the
testing on which hypothesis, laws, and, especially, theories rest. What
Popper seems to indicate is that empirical testing and corroboration of a
theory is never final or absolute. Moreover, testing is pursued only until
the researcher or the community is satisfied.

Postmodern Criticism of Scientific Method
By the end of the twentieth century, a select group of philosophers of
science became increasingly dissatisfied with the general description of
science (see discussion above). "Prominent among their ranks are Kuhn,
Feyerabend, the later Quine, the later Goodman, Rorty, and dozens of
lesser lights."lo4They submitted the generally accepted view of science to
criticism, which is not kindly received by many in the scientific
community.105The following quotation will give us the general idea of the
notion of science these philosophers of science are criticizing:
According to Legend, science has been very successful in attainingthese goals
[attainment of truth about the world]. Successive generations of scientists
have filled in more and more parts of the COMPLETE TRUE STORY OF
THE WORLD (or,perhaps, of the COMPLETETRUESTORY OF THE
OBSERVABLE PART OF THE WORLD). Champions of Legend
acknowledged that there have been mistakes and false steps here and there,
but they saw an overall trend toward accumulation of truth, or, at the very
least, of better and better approximationsto truth. Moreover, they offered
'OZ

Ibid., 144.

'05For instance, Laudan, 5, sees them as "postpositivists" endorsing "a thoroughgoing
epistemological relativism about science."

an explanation both for the occasional mistakes and for the dominant
progressive trend: scientists have achieved so much through the use of
SCIENTIFIC METHOD (emphasis original).lo6

Thus universal, unrestricted, sole authority is given to science over all
other human approachesto truth about the universe. Not surprisingly,the big
bang and evolutionary theories have become dogmatically affirmed by
scientists and accepted by theologians without much discussion.
The criticism produced by this new line of philosophers is farreaching and goes beyond the limits of this paper. Their criticism of
science, however, challenges the universality of scientific results.
Not Playing by the Rules
Feyerabend contends that when one takes time t o review all that is
involved in the actual methodological procedures used by scientists in
arriving at their interpretive constructions, one discovers that these
constructions are not built by playing "by the book," i.e., by generally
accepted rules of scientific investigation. The "perfect" narrative
enunciation of a scientific theory hides a lot of cut-corners, pushes
problems between theory and fact, and makes ad hoc approximation^'^^
that "conceal, and even eliminate, qualitative difficulties. They create a
false impression of the excellence of our science."lo8Moreover, in their
drive to find explanations for the astonishing complexity and variety in
nature, scientists never follow the rules for evaluating proposed theories
and even use falsified theories.lo9It would seem that what guides them to
accept theories is the feeling of power they receive when attempting to
'06Kitcher, The Advancement of Science, 3.
lo7Feyerabend,49, states: "Wherever we look, whenever we have a little patience and
select our evidence in an unprejudiced manner, we find that theories fail adequately to
reproduce certain qmntitative results, and that they are qualitatively incompetent to a
surprisingdegree. Sciencegives us theories of great beauty and sophistication.Modern science
has developed mathematical structures which exceed anything that has existed so far in
coherence generality and empirical success. But in order to achieve this miracle all the
existing troubles had to be pushed into the relation between theory and fact, and had to be
concealed by ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations and other procedures."
'O81bid.
lo91nour description of scientific methodology we saw that, according to Popper,
theories must be either falsified or corroborated. However, Feyerabend, 50, remarks that
"methodologistsmay point to the importance of falsifications-but they blithely use falsified
theories, they may sermonize how important it is to consider all the relevant evidence, and
never mention those big and drastic facts which show that the theories they admire and
accept may be as badly off as the older theories which they reject. In practice they slavishly
repeat the most recent pronouncements of the top dogs in physics, though in doing so they
must violate some very basic rules of their trade."
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explain the facts of nature. However, Feyerabend also reports that
"according to our present results, hardly any theory is consistent with the
facts. The demand to admit only those theories which are consistent with
the available and accepted facts again leaves us without any theory. (I
repeat: without any theory, for there is not a single theory that is not in
some trouble or other)" (emphasis original).'lo
Creating Our Own Rules
In practice, the circular nature of scientific methodology dmourages critical
thmlung and fosters dogmatism. Feyerabend denounces the existence of
scientific dogmatism that prevents challenges to the reigning theory. "In
cosmology a firm belief in the Big Bang now tends to devalue observations
that clash with it.""' Scientific journals give the round-about to those who
want to publish ideas contrary to the accepted theory, including evolution.'"
The reason for this dogmatism is a built-in circularity of reason and scientific
methodology. Scientific research starts by defining a problem, and problems
assume the existence of theories. Conversely, when a theory is formulated and
accepted it generates and influences research.
The scientific method is a hermeneutically and theoretically guided
process. Challenges to wide-reaching theories are not welcome because they
not only disturb the theory, but the entire constellation of other theories,
laws, and hypotheses that depend on it for their existence. It is much easier to
accept challenges to less inclusive or influential theories. This shows how
difficult it is to maintain the critical nature of scientific research.
Unfortunately, "there is no alternative to the project of using what we think
we know to appraise the methods which we take to be reliable."l13
As Kuhn explains, we become scientists by belonging to a scientific
tradition that passes the rules of the game from one generation to
another.l14 There is no alternative because reason's operation, the heart
and engine of the scientific method, requires the application of a priori
llOIbid.,50. Feyerabend, 39, states: "considering how the invention, elaboration and the
use of theories which are inconsistent, not just with other theories, but even with
experimentsJfactsJobservations, we may start by pointing out that no single theory ever agrees
with all the known facts in its domain. And the trouble is not created by rumors, or by the
result of sloppy procedure. It is created by experiments and measurements of the highest
precision and reliabilityn (emphasis original).
'"Ibid., 241.
'lZVerne Grant, The Evolutionary Process: A Critical Review of Evolutionary Process
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 14.
"'Ibid., 299.
l14Kuhn, 11-22;see also Feyerabend, 214-237.

ideas to the objects it attempts to understand and explain. The term "a
priori" may be interpreted in various ways. Kant defines it as forms,
categories, and regulative ideas. Others define it t o be hermeneutical
presuppositions, categories, schemata, patterns, theories, rules of the
game. Change in the interpretation of the a priori leads to paradigm
changes both in reason and science. This brings us to the impact of
postmodernity on the understanding of scientific methodology.
Universal Rules?
Scientific results depend on the application of a priori rules, which include
macro- (philosophical assumptions), meso- (methodological matrices
involving an entire constellation of scientific rules and procedures), and
micro- (theories, laws, and procedures that apply to specific fields of
research) hermeneutical presuppositions. These hermeneutical
presuppositions involve complex sets of theories and procedures of various
kinds that are not derived from data or facts, but which are variously
interpreted by philosop hers and scientists.
Scientific rationality is about using the "right" criteria, rules, or categories
to process the data, information, reasoning, and experiments required in the
operation of scientificresearch. In classical and modern times, it was generally
assumed on metaphysical grounds that all human beings, especially scientific
researchers, worked under the same universal rules. Various metaphysical and
epistemologicaltheories told "us why our criteriaof successful inquiry are not
just our criteria but also the right criteria, nature's criteria, the criteria which
will lead us to the truth.""5 Thus, modern science was born when
philosophers still assumed that the a priori rules of reason (epistemology)were
universally given to all human beings (foundationalism).
The demise of classical ontologyprecipitated by empiricist criticism made
the modern sciences possible, but, unfortunately, left them without the
foundations on which claims for universal truth had been grounded.
Postmodernity is the recognition of this fact.'16 The myth of science, briefly
put, consists in the illusion that empirical data is a foundation that produces
the "true," absolute, universal, and totally certain results that the old classical
metaphysics claimed to reach, but never did because it was too speculativeand
removed from reality. That many scientistsstill think along these general lines

'16Jean-Francois Lyotard explains that postmodernity has an "incredulity toward
metanarratives" (ThePostmodem Conditiom.A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and
Brian Massurni b e a p o l i s : University of Minnesota Press, 19791, xxiv). He, xxiv, states: "The
obsolescenceof the metanarrativeapparatusof legitimationcorresponds,most notably,to the crisis
of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it."
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becomes apparent in the controversy about the underdetermination of
scientific theories. In simple terms, can a body of empirical evidence render
only one rationally acceptable and valid explanation or many? Positivists
(modernists) argue in the affirmative; postpositivists (postmodernists or
relativists) argue in the negative. The controversy started by Hume continues
unabated into the twenty-first century."'
From scientific practice, as described by Feyerabend, and from
philosophical reflection, as developed by Heidegger and Gadamer,
postmodernity has made clear that there are no universal principles on
which the rational search for truth can be grounded. The principles and
rules of science are themselves the product of involved and complex
rational interpretations that change with the passage of time.'18 Thus,
absolute reason was replaced by hermeneutical reason.l19Scientists can no
longer assume a rational approach and or that the application of the
"rightmrules of the game will render one single, possible explanation of
reality, especially when the issue is so complex and inclusive as in the
question of origins. The more complex the facts are the more likely
various possible rational explanations will emerge.'"
Conflict of Interpretations or Universal Truth?
Can we decide between conflicting theories? Modernist positivist
philosophers of science say, yes, by a correct application of scientific
methodology, rationality, and with the progress and accumulation of
scientific knowledge. Postmodernist (postpositivist) philosophers of science
say no. This debate takes place under the label "commensurabilityof scientific
discourses or theories." Thus, this is not a debate about scientificmethod, but
about reason in general. Rorty describes commensurability as the ability " to
be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rationd agreement can
be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements
seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an ideal situation, in
"'For an introduction to the debate on underdetermination, see Laudan, 29-54.
ll8Feyerabend,51, states: "The material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his
laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemologicalprejudices,
his attitude towards the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is
indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated Ffom the historical
background. It is contaminated by principles which he does not know and which, if known,
would be extremely hard to test. Questionable views on cognition, such as the view that our
senses, used in normal circumstances, give reliable information about the world, may invade
the observation language itself, constituting the observationalterms as well as the distinction
between veridical and illusory appearance" (emphasis original).
'19This seems to be suggested by Rorty, 315-356.
"O~oran introduction to the notion of simplicity and its role in science, see Popper, 136-145.

which all residual disagreements will be seen to be 'noncognitive' or merely
verbal, or else merely temporary-capable of being resolved by doing
something further."121
Those who believe in the commensurabilityof theories assume that the
rules to bring about rational agreement exist and are accepted by all merely
because humans are rational beings. In this scenario, only one theory is
rational. The rest are "irrational," or as Rorty says, "noncognitive." To agree
is to be rational; to disagree with the consensus is to be "irrational." I think
most scientists and theologians believe that there is only one rational
explanation for every problem. It is from this meso-hermeneutical
presupposition that the relation between evolution and creation is addressed.
Since there can be only one possible rational explanation,any possible answer
must, therefore, be false or true. Scientific methodology, being rational, is able
to decide whether an explanation is true or false. The decision is made on the
basis of universal, rational rules of the rational-scientific game. In our case,
scientists advancing evolutionary theory dismiss creation as nonrational.12'
Since creation is based on supernatural revelation, it infringes upon the
material condition of method and, therefore, cannot be rational. If it is not
rational, then it is not true either.
Those who believe in the incommensurability of theories assume as
evident that there are no general rules of rationality binding all human
nature.123They are convinced that rational rules are determined by
conventional consensus among human beings and are transmitted through
tradition and education. Since there are no general rules that bind all
human beings together, there is no rational agreement between traditions
that work under different sets of rational rules. So neither creation nor
evolution can be considered irrational; both are rational, but work under
different rules of rationality and method. Neither can be dismissed as
"irrational" or "unscientific." In the case of conflict between theories,
postmodern philosophy asserts that reason cannot help us to decide
between them. This is because reason has no parameters or rules that may
serve as glides in the decision-makingprocess. Reason can only help us to

lZZIn
contrast to the methods of science, "the methods and claims of creationists are not
subject to experimentation, prediction, revision, or falsification. To them, these pursuits are
irrelevant, because they believe they possess the 'truth' as set forth in the Bible" (Berra, 4).
12'Laudan,6-14,deals with incommensurability at a linguistic level which challengesthe
translation and comparison of contents of rival theories. He correctly argues in favor of
translation and comparison. The ultimate problem, however, is how to decide between
conflicting theories once we have compared them. The problem between creationism and
evolutionism is not about translation or comparison, but about truth. Can the truth be
decided on the basis of reasoning and interpretation?
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interpret reality, but it may not decide between the interpretations it
helped us to produce.
In many cases, theories are incommensurable. However, this does not
mean that we cannot decide which theory is true. It means only that we
cannot decide on a rational basis. There are other ways besides reason that
we can take to decide between theories. Postmodernity only reveals
rational incommensurability. We cannot decide the truth about theory
from a set of scientific rules of interpretation and make decisions about
what is truth. Yet, scientific method has more than merely rational rules
of interpretation. Rules of interpretation are, simply, the contributions
from the side of the subject in the subject-object relationship. But
knowledge and scientific method also have contributions from the side of
from the side of the
the object. So, scientific theories are incommensz~rable
subject (rational rules), but commensurable from the side of the object,
which reason attempts to interpret. Thus, creation and evolution are
incommensurable from the side of the rules of the game they operate
under (the conditions of method), but are commensurable from the
perspective of the reality they attempt to interpret, e.g., the origin of the
universe and life on earth. The decision to adopt one theory over another,
then, does not flow from the rational rules of the game,
but from the
relation of theory and reality. In this way, we come back to the complex
issues of verifiability, corroboration, and the testing of scientific
th e ~ r i e s . ' ~ ~
Reason and science can only produce conflicting interpretations, not
universal truths that all human beings are bound to accept merely because
humans are rational beings. Moreover, reason cannot help us to decide
between conflicting interpretations. But a choice must be made, otherwise
theory-oriented scientific method cannot operate. Use of a theory implicitly
implies a belief in its truthfulness. Since we do not choose on the basis of
universal, rational truth, choices always involve faith. With the passage of
time, choices become immovable scientific dogmas, especially when used to
understand other aspects of reality. This happensin science,particularly in the
case of the interpretation of the origins of the universe and life. Changes in
all-inclusive issues impact the entire field of scientific studies.
The general description of scientific methodology provided above
clearly dispels the popular myth of science as an infallible instrument for
'24Thisis a very complex issue. Since scientific testing does not take place outside of theory
but from theory and reason, it is not clear whether an "impartial" decision can be consistently
reached, especiallyin macro-hermeneuticalissues.Accordingto Kuhn, one of the "bad boys" in the
philosophy of science,changesin macro-hermeneuticalissues are possible, but take long periods of
time and occur within the dynamics of hermeneutics and history. They do not result from the
unprejudced use of reason or scientific methodology (Kuhn, 1G11).

discovering absolute truth. Postmodernism has brought down the myth
of reason as the absolute arbiter of what truth is. Recent criticism of
scientific methodology has shown the historical-hermeneuticalcomponent
of scientific methodology and its dependence on tradition and authority.
In Feyerabend's words, "science is not sacrosanct."125
However in Western
society, the myth persists, probably due to the need to find answers to
perennial questions and the willingness to accept as final the theories of
science rather than traditional philosophical or theological explanations.
Because empirical science seems to be closer to the facts than philosophy
and theology, our culture confers to it a higher reliability and authority.
For theology, these philosophical developments mean that a theology
based on the principle of soh Scrzptura is not irrational. The counterpart to
what scientists call speculation or guess in creating and building a
comprehensive evolutionary worldview, is what Scripture calls divine
inspiration. Evolution stands as the rational explanation produced by the
scientific community in the Western world, while biblical inspiration stands
as the rational explanation of the community of faith received from God by
way of divine revelation and inspiration. Certainly, from a rational
perspective,these two theories are incommensurable. From the perspective of
the reality they explain, however, they are commensurable. Because they
explain the same reality in opposite ways, they stand in conflict. And we are
compelled to choose between them because the functioning of reason and
scientificmethodology requires we assume a specific cosmology. Yet, because
reason has no universal rules, choices of cosmology stand on faith, not only
in theology, but also in empirical science. Thus, reason does not force
Adventism, for instance, to adapt the biblical account of creation to an
evolutionary explanation in order to safeguard its rationality.

Conclusion
We have so far described the major components involved in the method
on which the prestige of science and the authority of the evolutionary
theory is built. As the church considers how to relate to evolution, it is
important to have in mind a general picture of science. The description
presented in this article has been based primarily on Bunge's description
and Popper's focused analysis. I would like to conclude this discussion of
the scientific method with Popper's conclusions.
The analysis of scientific methodology as a general research model
reveals some important characteristics that should be considered when
approaching the science-theology relation and the question of origins.
(I) Science does not produce absolute truth. The application of the
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scientific method does not produce absolute final discovery of truth, but
helps us to wrestle with the constant task of interpreting reality. "Science
is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a system
which steadily advances towards a state of finality. O u r science is not
knowledge (episteme):it can never claim to have attained truth, or even t o
be a substitute for it, such as probability. . . . W e do not know: we can only
guess. And our guesses are guided by the unscientific, the metaphysical
(though biologically explicable) faith in laws, in regularities which we can
uncover-discover" (emphasis original). 12'
(2) Science is not dogmatic. The dogmatic use of scientific conclusions,
therefore, goes against the method and spirit of science.
Once put forward, none of our "anticipations" are dogmatically upheld.
Our method of research is not to defend them, in order to prove how
right we were. On the contrary, we try to overthrow them. Using all
the weapons of our logical, mathematical, and technical armory, we try
to prove that our anticipations were false-in order to put forward, in
their stead, new unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, new "rash
and premature prejudicesn,as Bacon derisively called them.lZ7

(3) To do science is to interpret. Scientific method does not proceed by
way of discovering absolute truth in empirical facts, but by way of
interpretation, construction of explanations, bold ideas, and speculation.
"Out of uninterpreted sense-experiences science cannot be distilled, no
matter how industriously we gather and sort them. Bold ideas, unjustified
anticipations, and speculative thought, are our only means for interpreting
nature: our only organon, our only instrument for grasping her."lz8
(4) Science as interpetation requires scientific a priories. This becomes
apparent when we deal with the hermeneutical condition of method. "Even
the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired
by ideas: experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by
the01-y.""~
(5) Science cannotproduceabsolutely certain, only tentative, results. This
is a most important characteristic of science because it anticipates
postmodernity. "The old scientific idea of episteme-of absolutely certain,
demonstrable knowledge-has proved to be an idol. The demand for
scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement
must remain tentativeforever. It may indeed be corroborated, but every
corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are tentative.
Popper, 278.
12'Ibid.,279.
"'Ibid.,

280.

lZ9Ibid.

Only in our subjective experience of conviction in our subjective faith,
can we be 'absolutely certain'" (emphasis original).130"The wrong view of
science betrays itself in the craving to be right; for it is not his possession
of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his
persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth.""'

